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The Age of Jihad

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The Age of Jihad

Islamic State and the Great War for the Middle East

Verso Books,

15 Minuten Lesezeit
10 Take-aways
Audio & Text

Was ist drin?

The Age of Jihad won’t end with the defeat of ISIS.

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Editorial Rating

9

Qualities

  • Controversial
  • Eye Opening
  • Background

Recommendation

Irish journalist Patrick Cockburn reveals the intractability of the Middle East conflict, from Syria to Nigeria, from Tunisia to Afghanistan. He fills in his dispatches, written between 2001 and 2016, with anecdotes from eight Middle East wars. He explains how sectarianism weights any peace process and one country’s circumstances “cross-infect” neighboring countries. He asks if these conflicts could be stopped, if the lust for revenge could be staunched and if the wounds of history could be lanced. Most probably not, he concludes, because, “the demons in this age of chaos and war have become an unstoppable force.” While always politically neutral, getAbstract recommends this informed, sweeping overview.

Summary

Afghanistan (2001)

After the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the US had a narrow focus: to strike back at its Arab enemies in Northeast Afghanistan – a country that already had been at war for a generation. In the four-year civil war leading up to Taliban rule in 1996, 100,000 people died in Kabul alone. In the fall of 2001, US air power enabled the Northern Alliance, a collection of anti-Taliban warlords, to unseat the weak Taliban government. The Alliance was militarily weak but politically skillful. Afghanistan finally appeared to offer its people what they most wanted: security.

Iraq (1990-2003)

The American decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was a foolish choice. It stemmed partly from a misreading of Baathists, who were not diehard Saddam Hussein loyalists, as US policy makers assumed. Many Baathists were trained bureaucrats who needed jobs, and who filled necessary functions. Baath party members held more religious affinities than political ones. Even after Saddam, the Iraqi people saw Baghdad’s Shia government as allied with the US, and lacking legitimacy. The people of the Levant remembered Britain’s colonial history ...

About the Author

Patrick Cockburn is foreign correspondent for the British online newspaper The Independent and has written three books about Iraq.

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