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Incentive Pay and Bank Risk-Taking
Report

Incentive Pay and Bank Risk-Taking

Evidence from Austrian, German, and Swiss Banks


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Editorial Rating

7

Qualities

  • Comprehensive
  • Analytical
  • Innovative

Recommendation

Banks enjoy a unique position in the capitalist economy: As vital financial infrastructure, they are subject to rules and scrutiny, and they benefit from explicit and implicit government guarantees. As businesses, they must generate good returns for shareholders. But how good, and at what cost to society? This statistically complex and perhaps overly ambitious study by economists Matthias Efing, Harald Hau, Patrick Kampkötter and Johannes Steinbrecher seeks a connection between big bonuses and bank risk taking. Though the authors themselves recognize the inherent shortcomings as well as the socio-political aspects of their work, getAbstract nonetheless suggests their report to bank executives and human resources professionals for its contribution to the study of human economic behavior.

Take-Aways

  • Many observers believe that high pre-2008 incentive pay led to irresponsible behavior among bank traders who helped caused the crisis.
  • Payroll data collected from more than 120 banks in Germany, Austria and Switzerland indicate the extent of the role incentives and risk accumulation played within institutions from 2004 to 2011.
  • Prior to the crisis, banks’ trading activities didn’t add to their net present value. In fact, incentive pay led to risk-taking behavior out of line with measures that correlate trading income, volatility and banks’ overall returns.

About the Authors

Matthias Efing is a research assistant and Harald Hau is a professor of economics at the University of Geneva. Patrick Kampkötter is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Cologne, and Johannes Steinbrecher is a researcher at the CESifo Institute Dresden.


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